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Abstract 
The first question dealt with in the paper is whether it’s worth worrying about unequal income 
distribution. The supposed long run constant factor shares, the positive effects of inequality and the 
greater importance of absolute level of income compared to its unequal distribution seems to deny 
this need. On the contrary,  economic, social and fairness reasons support the need to care about u-
nequal income distribution. Therefore, measures should be taken about income inequality, and a di-
stinction has to be made between measures to prevent excessive inequality from happening and me-
asures to redistribute income once inequality has taken place. In order to envisage appropriate mea-
sures it is necessary to find out what causes the growing trend of increasing inequality in income 
distribution: economic and institutional factors are taken into consideration. Consequently a range of 
measures are suggested, which go from reducing the “degree of monopoly” in the economy to  regu-
lating the financial system, from improving the system of collective bargaining to curbing the “pre-
datory behaviour” of the executives. Redistribution measures are also discussed, with a warning a-
bout the risk of causing with them more harm than the inequality they are supposed to counteract. 
Classificazione JEL: D31, D33. 
Parole chiave: Income distribution; income inequality, redistribution. 
 
 
Che fare a proposito della diseguaglianza nella distribuzione del 
reddito  
 
Sommario 
Nell’articolo ci si chiede quali misure possano essere adottate per contrastare la costante tenden-
za alla crescita della disuguglianza nella distribuzione del reddito. Due questioni preliminari vengono 
pertanto affrontate. La prima è se la diseguaglianza nella distribuzione del reddito sia utile per una 
buona performance del sistema economico; la seconda riguarda l’individuazione delle cause che 
determinano la diseguaglianza. Sulla base delle conclusioni raggiunte in proposito si suggeriscono 
alcune misure finalizzate sia a impedire la crescita di una eccessiva diseguaglianza primaria sia a 
operare una redistribuzione una volta che la diseguaglianza primaria si sia materializzata. Il rischio 
che misure redistributive distorcano il funzionamento dell’economia spinge a preferire misure che 
contrastino la nascita di una eccessiva diseguaglianza. 
JEL Classification: D31, D33. 
Keywords: distribuzione del reddito, disuguaglianze di reddito, redistribuzione. 
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Introduction. Basic definitions 
 
The aim of this paper is to suggest measures to curb or to counteract ex-
cessive income inequality. But this implies in the first place the idea that 
inequality is for some reasons “bad” (may be for reasons related to fairness 
or to economic performance) and has to be avoided; but this is an idea that 
cannot be taken for granted. In the second place it implies the belief that 
inequality is not the natural consequence of a good working of a competiti-
ve economic system. Even if this were the case, though, on the basis of the 
first consideration it could be considered wise either to constrain the growth 
of inequality or to reduce it through redistribution measures, or both. 
In order to proceed it is first necessary to define clearly what is meant 
by “income inequality”. This concept has to do with the distribution of in-
come, and therefore has to be considered under  two aspects: functional di-
stribution and personal distribution. The first is related to the shares of 
GDP which go to different factors of production and can be represented re-
spectively by the ratio of labour income (wages, salaries and other work-
related compensations) to total income and by the ratio of capital income 
(interests, dividends and other returns on capital) to total income. The se-
cond is the dispersion of annual income across households and it is mostly 
indicated by the Gini coefficient. 
The capital share, as the residual of the labour share, is therefore: 
 
1 - (employee compensation/ GDP) 
 
This definition still maintains some ambiguities. For instance, it does 
not consider the income of self-employed, underestimating in this way the 
labour share. To adjust for this (Gollin, 2002) suggests to include “the op-
erating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises (OSPUE)” in the com-
putation of labour share. Some doubts also exist about where to locate the 
fiscal wedge. Surely it is not profit, nor rent: it should be labour income al-
though workers do not perceive it as such. On the contrary, workers percei-
ve as income the interest paid on public debt. Rent from owner-occupied 
houses, social transfers and government benefits, pension funds, the aggre-
gation of profits and rents (Atkinson), and also the aggregation of physical 
capital and natural capital (Gollin, 2008) all pose similar problems. 
In a simplified model the share of labour is: 
  
total labour cost/GDP 
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which may also be expressed as:  
 
Nd · w / Y · p 
 
or, if Gollin’s suggestion is followed, 
 
Nd · w + ospue / Y · p 
 
Where Nd is the number of employees, w the nominal wage, ospue is 
the proxy of the number of selfemployed multiplied by their unit income, Y 
is the physical output, p the price  level.  
Alternatively, whatever the measures used for the aggregates, supposing 
that the average compensation for selfemployed and similar is the same as 
for employees, the share of labour can be viewed as:  
 
W · N/L 
Y 
 
Where W is total wage compensation, N is total employment, L is total 
employees and Y is total value added. Therefore 
 
W  ·  N 
Y     L 
 
And so 
 
W/L 
 
is the share of labour 
 
Y/N 
 
The relative shares of capital and labour, on the other hand, can general-
ly be described as: 
 
Π/W = K/L π/w 
 
Income inequality is the extent to which the distribution of income 
among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a per-
fectly equal distribution. Obviously there are connections between factor 
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shares and income inequality. A first connection is a structural one: since 
labour income is generally more evenly distributed than capital income, a 
change in factor shares entails per se a change in personal income distribu-
tion, in the sense that a decline in labour share is associated automatically 
to a more uneven distribution of personal income. This effect is, obviously, 
stronger the higher the difference between the dispersion of income distri-
bution, say the gini coefficients, within each of the two categories.  Beside 
this, the connection could be more complicated in case of different (and 
possibly opposite) movements in the rate of change of N and w (wage rate). 
In other words, considering the above version, the movement of labour 
share depends on the relative behaviour of the two ratios W/L and Y/N and 
on all the factors that impact on them. 
 
 
1. First question. Why to worry about income distribution 
 
The first question to be answered in order to proceed in developing the 
theme of the paper is whether, and why, to care about income distribution. 
There are two main reasons why it doesn’t seem to be the case to worry a-
bout. The first one is that inequality is in any case beneficial to growth. We 
can still read (Chegg Study on internet) sentences like this: “As income 
shares become more equal, the incentive for individuals to accumulate 
skills, work hard and take risks may become smaller, thus shrinking the si-
ze of the economy”. So, any attempt to promote equity would interfere with 
market forces and would be detrimental to growth( Welch 1999) and there-
fore, at the end, would cause everybody to be worse off. The alleged trade-
off between equity and growth should in any case be resolved in favour of 
growth. 
The second reason is that there would be an intrinsic law in the working 
of the economy which would keep constant in the long run the factor shares 
of income. This vision goes back to the well known “Bowley’s law”, deri-
ved from empirical observation, but it is also part of theoretical models of 
growth, from Solow to Kaldor, who also included the constancy of factor 
shares among his “stylized facts”. 
Through his technical progress function, Kaldor sees the economy as 
converging towards a balanced path of growth in which ∆y/y = ∆k/k (being 
k= K/L and y= Y/L) , therefore a growing capital-labour ratio at the same 
rate as the  income-labour ratio would imply a constant ∆Y/∆K: that is neu-
tral technical progress with a constant profit rate and constant factor shares 
of income. The similar growth of income and factors productivity in pre-
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sence of growing population and full employment may be explained by 
compensating trends in productivity per hours worked and number of hours 
worked per man. Kaldor (contrary to recent data) found empirical support 
for this model. 
The same vision of stable factor shares belongs to the neoclassical 
world, where distribution is obviously and always “fair” since it is “techni-
cally” determined by the marginal productivity of factors, and any attempt 
to violate this natural law should be rejected. In the Cobb Douglas produc-
tion function the factor shares are simply the exponents of K and L. The 
stability of factor shares is explained by unit elasticity of substitution to 
factor prices, while elasticities less than one and more than one would im-
ply, in case of decline of the capital/labour ratio respectively an increase or 
a decrease in the wage share. The opposite would hold in case of increase 
of the capital /labour ratio. 
Kalecki  seems to accept the stability of factor shares in his basic model 
but actually he introduces two factors that can alter the shares: the degree of 
monopoly, as it influences the mark-up, and the relative power of social 
parts (Sylos Labini, 1984). He also explicitly states that although “the share 
of wages does not seem to show marked cyclical fluctuations”, “no a priori 
statement is possible as to the long run trend of the relative shares of wages 
in income” (Kalecki, 1965, pag.31). 
As for the classical economists, no specific indications about the evolu-
tion of labour shares are made. Ricardo, who thought of distribution as the 
principal problem of the economy, complicated the frame by introducing 
the role of land rent, which progressively would squeeze profits, while wa-
ges were considered set at the subsistence level. Marx was more interested 
in the movement of the rate of profit, rather than the share of profits, and 
expected it to fall in the long run due the growth of the “organic composi-
tion of capital”, although he was aware of counteracting forces which could 
delay this result. The role of relative powers in the class struggle was em-
phasized in determining the rate of surplus value on which the rate of profit 
mainly would depend. 
 
 
2. Reasons to care about distribution 
 
The statement that labour shares are constant over time is theoretically 
weak and contrary to empirical evidence. There has been an overall decline 
in the share of labour during the last 20-20 years (Kramer, 2011). 
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On the side of personal distribution, there is wide empirical evidence of 
the general increase in the Gini coefficient in the last decades (Smeeding, 
Morelli, Thompson, 2013). 
Then, there is the appalling difference among top level salaries and or-
dinary wages. It is not an irrelevant fact that while in the seventies and 
eighties the salary of the 350 largest companies in the US were 20-30 times 
the wage of an ordinary worker, around 2010 the difference jumped to 200 
– 400 times, and in the UK above 300 times (Michel, 2012). 
The reasons to care about the worsening of wage share and income ine-
quality are grounded on one side on fairness issues, and on the other side 
on the impact on economic performance itself. 
Fairness is obviously connected to a system of value judgements, but in 
general terms fairness in income distribution, conceived as a low level of 
inequality, is more and more being considered as a positive requirement for 
modern and democratic societies. A part from “metaphysical” principles, 
this is also due to some consequences that income inequality is bound to 
produce in society. 
One of these is the reduction of social mobility. There is wide empirical 
evidence that high levels of income inequality as measured by Gini coeffi-
cients are associated with  high levels  of intergenerational elasticity (which 
is the coefficient obtained by regressing children’s income in  adulthood on 
their parental income; a coefficient of 1 would mean that all the income dif-
ference between parents would be passed on to children) (Andersen, 2009). 
Another unpleasant consequence is the lowering of social cohesion, and 
particularly of trust relationships, which are of vital importance for the 
good and smooth working of markets and of social interactions as a whole. 
The sense of unfairness which is connected with large inequality creates 
distrust and lack of cooperative attitude among people. Furthermore, since 
unleashed inequality is perceived as a violation of the principles of appro-
priate rewards and reconnaissance of merits and skills, it appears to be a re-
sult of “predatory behaviour” (Fitoussi, 2011) and it may also discourage 
young people from engaging in skill acquisition and in accumulation of 
human capital. 
Finally, income inequality has been proved to be positively correlated 
with all sort of bad social indicators, such as crime, violence, drug abuse 
and so on (Wilkinson, 2009). 
Having considered all this, it may still be objected that the fairness ar-
gument is not decisive in order to make a choice in favour of taking action 
to counteract inequality. 
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It might well be that equality is detrimental to growth, as one could de-
duct if less inequality were empirically associated with less growth. In that 
case it could be preferable to sacrifice some equality to preserve more 
growth. A trade off would appear and the choice would become dependent 
on the preference function of society. 
As a matter of fact this is not the case. It is not possible here to comment 
on all the existing literature on this topic, but it is possible to say that in 
general the empirical evidence shows that “there is a strong negative rela-
tion between the level of net inequality and growth of income per capita in 
the sequent period; the statistical evidence generally supports the view that 
inequality impedes growth, at least over the medium term, and have found 
that inequality is associated with slower and less durable growth. The few 
exceptions (Forbes, 2000; Banerjee and Duflo, 2003) tend to pick up am-
biguous short-run correlations” (Ostry, 2014). As far as developing coun-
tries are concerned it seems that “longer growth spells are robustly associ-
ate with more equality in the income distribution” (Berg, 2011). As for the 
relation between redistribution of income and growth, some qualifications 
have to be introduced, which we shall discuss later. 
The factors to which such relation can be attributed are now to be point-
ed out. 
The first factor is the shrinking of effective demand, with direct conse-
quences on this fundamental driver of growth, or, in order to avoid these,  
the increase of leverage in support of aggregate demand. This is bound to 
cause (and actually it has  triggered) financial crisis (Rajan, Pivetti). Due to 
different (and decreasing) marginal propensity to consume, a growing con-
centration of income implies a declining consumer demand. This decline 
could lead to an underconsumption crisis (of Marxian flavour): in order to 
escape from this, aggregate demand has to be sustained through private 
indebtness. 
The second factor is the accumulation of enormous wealth in the hands 
of a restricted number of people. This accumulation takes place through a 
combined dynamics of uneven distribution of income and expansion of the 
financial sector, implying in this way a significant change in factor share 
due to growth of financial rents. As a consequence, and with the help of 
lacking financial markets regulation, financial excess becomes possible, 
and with it the weakening of growth and the strengthening of financial in-
stability (Stiglitz, 2012; Galbraith, 2012). Besides, the rich may come to get 
enough power as to gain full control of the policy makers. In this way they 
can prevent the adoption of policies capable of reducing inequality, and 
possibly favour policies capable of increasing it. 
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A third factor can be detected in the fact that income inequality under-
mines progress in health and education. Bad health conditions, low living 
standards and poor education among the population lead to a slow down of 
growth (Galor, 2004). 
Although the relation between human capital and growth or per capita 
income is far from univocal, mostly due to ambiguities in human capital 
measurement, it is generally recognised, though, that higher levels (and bet-
ter quality) of education improve the pro-growth attitudes of economic a-
gents and increase the absorption capacity of innovations. 
Finally, a low level of inequality is thought to enhance social cohesion, 
and this in turn is able to provide an institutional set up capable of solving 
conflicts and better reacting to external shocks (Rodrik, 1999). The lack of 
social consensus, which is favoured by inequality, is bound to seriously 
dampen social and political stability, the efficient working of the market 
and the process of growth. 
 
 
3. Causes of income inequality 
 
Since, besides being considered unfair, inequality is also detrimental to 
growth, there are enough reasons to believe that action should be taken to 
reduce it. There are essentially two ways to reduce inequality: one is to 
adopt redistribution measures once it has happened, the other is to adopt 
measures and strategies to prevent it from happening. In order to be able to 
act on this second line it is necessary to consider the causes which are at the 
root of the process of unequal distribution. 
The deepest root of the general growth of inequality that has taken place 
in the last  decades is surely to be found in the change of political climate 
towards neo liberalism (Dumenil, 2001). Political and institutional evolu-
tion has been deeply influenced by this ideological orientation so that the 
entire working of the economic system has taken a shape coherent with the 
growth of inequality. 
A reflection of this attitude is given by labour market policy. Here the 
insistence on “flexibilisation” together with “wage devaluation” in order to 
win competition has led to a strong segmentation of labour markets with 
high wages differences and a fall in the general level of wages. The conse-
quent fall in aggregate demand was supposed to be compensated by an in-
crease in exports due to higher competitiveness; something that, of course, 
cannot stand if all countries are taken together as a whole. Nevertheless, 
these policies have led to increasing income inequality. 
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A second expression of this political orientation has been the implemen-
tation of recessive macroeconomic policy. The objective of fiscal consoli-
dation, the pro-cyclical automatic mechanism of balanced public budget 
adopted by the European Union, the set of recessive economic policies im-
posed by international financial institutions (particularly the IMF) to coun-
tries with difficulties in change for financial assistance has led to increase 
in unemployment an therefore to growth of inequality. 
As a consequence of growing unemployment and of deliberate steps to 
reduce trade unions power and role, the neo-liberalism attitude has led to a 
decline of unionization. But, there exists a negative relation between ine-
quality and degree of unionization, as widely recognised in the literature 
(Gustafsson, 1997; Colin Gordon, 2012). 
The scope of collective bargaining has diminished everywhere. An in-
creasing trend towards decentralization of bargaining to firm level on one 
hand, and to escape collective bargaining through individual agreements on 
the other hand, has weakened the opposition to wage fall and has enhanced 
the inequality of wages. 
A fourth cause of the rise of inequality is the progressive rise of 
financialization since the ‘80s.  One relevant aspect of this rise is the size of 
the financial capital involved and the other is the absence of appropriate re-
gulation of financial markets. The unleashed diffusion of derivatives, the 
large proportion of OTC transactions, the mixture of commercial and 
investment banks have enhanced the possibility of gains for those at the top 
to such an extent to allow wide and excessive speculative behaviour. In ad-
dition, the financial sector has been so empowered to gain control over the 
policymakers and the institutions that policy action to change the status quo 
is rendered highly unlikely, if not impossible. (Epstein, 2005; Glyn, 2006; 
Palley, 2008). Another unpleasant consequence with regard to the real sec-
tor and income inequality is given by the possibility that investment in fi-
nancial assets (which offer higher returns) become substitute for investment 
in physical capital, dampening the growth of productive capacity and de-
pressing the level of economic activity (Stockhammer, 2004). It is also pos-
sible that the increasing transfer of firms ownership to financial institutions 
exerts on them a pressure for higher returns, which means a pressure for in-
creasing the profits at the expenses of wages and consequently worsening 
the inequality of income distribution. 
A further cause of inequality is abundantly mentioned in the literature: 
globalisation. Globalization actually boils down to the fact that goods can 
be produced everywhere and sold everywhere, with no restrictions to their 
mobility and with diminishing transport costs. This situation is able to pro-
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duce a series of consequences that affect income distribution. Contrary to 
the ambiguous advantages alleged by traditional mainstream trade theory 
fundamentally based on the Samuel theorem, the empirical evidence shows 
that globalisation has definitely contributed to the decline of the wage 
share, as also the IMF has come to admit: “globalization is one of several 
factors that have acted to reduce the share of income accruing to labor in 
advanced economies” (IMF 2007a, 161). There is no evidence at all that the 
opposite might have happened in developing economies. There are presum-
ably three main ways through which a pressure to reduce wages is exerted 
by globalization. The first is the attempt of firms to become more competi-
tive through wage cost reduction, the second is the offshoring of production 
to where total unit costs (not only labour) are lower, which undermines the 
levels of employment in advanced countries and so acts against  wage rise. 
The third is the simple threatening of relocating production, which can be 
used as a sort of “discipline device” to cut down the bargaining power of 
trade unions and workers in general (Rodrik, 1997). Such a threat is also 
used to induce workers to accept not only lower wages but also worse 
working conditions, and governments to change labour market regulation 
towards lower labour standards and lower employment protection. 
A sixth causal factor of inequality has to be considered, and that is tech-
nological change. Although deducting the evolution of “capital intensity” 
of production from a neoclassical production function is somehow less than 
correct, empirical evidence shows an association between the evolution of 
productive technology and the evolution of income inequality. The Europe-
an Commission, in a report of the 2007, states that “the estimation results 
clearly indicate that technological progress made the largest contribution to 
the fall in the aggregate labour income share”. The possible explanations 
for its influence on unequal income distribution go from the one saying that 
skill biased technical progress  increases the marginal productivity of high 
skilled workers relative to low skilled, so determining a widening of the 
different compensations to another one saying that, being technologically 
advanced capital goods substitutes for unskilled labour, the demand for this 
kind of labour tends to fall compared with demand for skilled workers and 
consequently the wage gap tends to increase. 
A last causal factor to be considered is the growth of bargaining power 
of firms. This power enables them on one side to compress the level of 
nominal wages and on the other side to increase the mark-up and raise the 
level of prices. The intensity of this process is determined by the degree of 
monopoly, as Kalecki pointed out. The consequent increase in profits is 
then enjoyed by the executives of the monopolistic firms, through decisions 
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about their salaries and benefits taken at the level of the board of adminis-
trators. No restrictions whatsoever are met in taking these decisions, so the 
enormous and growing gap between top level salaries and ordinary level 
wages cannot be ascribed to increasing productivity or other imaginary 
forces of a perfect competitive market, but only to what has been called 
“predatory behavior” of the executives, made possible precisely by the 
enormous power obtained by the high degree of monopoly present in the 
market. 
 
 
4. Policy suggestions to counteract inequality 
 
Once it is established that (excessive) income inequality is detrimental 
not only to fairness but also to growth, the problem arises of how to curb it, 
or how to avert it. Care should be taken of the risk that measures taken to 
counteract inequality might be detrimental to fairness and growth more 
than inequality itself (Okun, 1975; Barro, 1990). If it were so, the damage 
of inequality would be doubled: not only it would be pernicious in the first 
place, but also because it would call forth measures to counteract, which 
would possibly add up in damaging the proper working of the economic 
system. 
The ways to counteract income inequality are substantially of two kinds. 
The first is to let the market forces act freely and produce whatever inequal-
ity they can, and only afterwards intervene to correct it with redistributions 
measures; the second is to take measures to prevent excessive inequality 
from happening in the first place. While the first way is exposed to risk of 
adopting a medicine that may turn out to be worse than the illness and the-
refore requires a careful attention to select the right measures, the first can 
be accused of interfering with the free market mechanism. 
On the basis that reducing market inequality (that is inequality before 
redistribution through taxation or social expenditure) would also reduce the 
strength of measures needed for redistribution, the first way should be pre-
ferred. It also should be preferred because the so called “interference” with 
the free market mechanism is in fact directed  to avoid distortions in its 
working and most market failures. 
a) Measures to prevent income inequality 
The measures that have to be suggested in this direction are strictly rela-
ted to the causes of inequality of income that have been mentioned above. 
In this regard, the first market failure to take account of is monopolistic 
concentration.  Fighting monopolistic concentration is not an easy goal, but 
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concrete steps should be taken at national and international level to safe-
guard free competition and provide in this way less scope for mark-up in-
creases. Being the level of mark-up, as it has been mentioned (Kalecki, 
1965), a factor that influences the functional income distribution this would 
also help to lessen the production of income inequality. Since the concen-
tration of market power in the big corporations has been favored worldwide 
by the process of globalization, the strength of antitrust institutions should 
be improved at the international level (for instance within the European 
Union) as well as at the national level. As for natural monopolies, particular 
attention has to be drawn on the need to reinforce the regulatory system in 
the field of utilities. 
When we come to consider financialization, another factor that has been 
considered as strongly influencing the unequal income distribution, a whole 
range of institutional regulatory innovations appear to be necessary. The 
lack of  appropriate global financial governance has left unrestricted free-
dom not only relative to movements but also relative to the unlimited diver-
sification of financial products. National states do not seem to be able to 
cope with this enormous geographical mobility of incredible masses of fi-
nancial capital; international institutions seem to be reluctant to take signi-
ficant action. The set up in the European Union of the Systemic Risk Board 
and the three connected agencies does not seem so effective in regulating 
the financial markets, probably because of their composition and because of 
the limited powers with which they have been endowed.  Stronger action 
must be taken, such as  separating commercial banks from investment 
banks,  restricting the operation activity in unregulated markets (OTC 
transactions), redefining the role of the rating agencies. 
A third step should be towards a deep restructuring of collective bargai-
ning and labor market regulation. Undoubtedly, the growth of unemplo-
yment due to recession weakens the bargaining power of workers as far as 
wage settlement is concerned. Nonetheless institutional factors  play a rele-
vant role: pushing the decentralization of bargaining too far could be of 
some relief to single enterprises but would  also imply less power left to 
workers organizations and also less attention paid to macroeconomic a-
spects of wage settlements (such as aggregate demand, growth, inflation, 
international competition). The same is bound to happen when the labour 
market is fragmented (often in the name of flexibility) in an excessive va-
riety of labour contracts. A stronger association between productivity 
dynamics and labour compensation dynamics should be pursued, in order 
not to let profits to enjoy bigger and bigger parts of growing productivity. 
In parallel, the growth of productivity should be stimulated, avoiding to 
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provide a negative incentive  towards innovation by the use of low paid - 
low skilled work.  To the same end, in order not to permit that slow inno-
vating firms be allowed to compensate such delay with slow wage dynam-
ics, a kind of planned rate of productivity increase could be adopted as a 
reference (Fadda, 2013; Tridico, 2014). 
Parallel to these labour market measures, a general stronger involvement 
of trade unions in a kind of interactive, network, governance is advisable. 
The graphs above show an inverse relationship between union coverage 
and income inequality. A social partnership capable to stimulate a respon-
sible interaction and a cooperative participation of trade unions (as it is in 
the German case) would also improve the economic performance as a who-
le. Of course this cannot be only the result of  institutional features de-
signed by the law, or an expression of an attitude not exactly corresponding 
with the present neo-liberal trend; it also requires a maturity in trade unions 
which makes them capable of giving positive contributions to the solution 
of social conflicts, to growth of trust in society and to enlargement of social 
consensus. 
Counteracting the negative effects of globalization with regard to inco-
me inequality requires a series of general economic policy measures which 
run from international trade regulation to bilateral agreements between na-
tion states. Looking more closely at the aspects mentioned above, and par-
ticularly at the actual or threatened relocation of production, two lines of 
action can be suggested. The first is related to production costs. It would be 
wise, instead of allowing for reduction in wages, to act on one side to lower 
the quota of labour costs within total costs by increasing labour producti-
vity through innovation, and on the other side to also lower the other 
production costs, such as energy, tariffs, transports, services to firms, raw 
materials and so on. The second is to obtain an adequate level of internatio-
nal harmonization and cooperation among national trade unions. This 
would help to avoid social dumping and to prevent a downward wage and 
labour standard competition among workers in different States in order to 
subtract to each other the location of production. It surely sounds strange 
that trade unions, which were made precisely in order to avoid such compe-
tition between individual workers, let  I possible among workers of diffe-
rent nations through the absence of international coordination among them. 
Finally, there is the need to refrain the “predatory” behaviour of the ri-
chest which has been mentioned above. This behaviour finds expression in 
two ways: The extraction of rents in different fields ( monopolistic quasi-
rents, financial rents, urban rents, political and public sector rents, rent see-
king behaviour in the Public Administration and so on) and the self-
 32 
decisions about compensations and fringe benefits taken within the board 
of executives. There are mainly two ways of counteracting this (apart from 
a general change of cultural attitudes which determine what degree in the 
gap between the best paid and the less paid is socially acceptable). The first 
is to set a ceiling by law to salaries and all the executive benefits. Whether 
this is possible also for the private sector rather than for the public sector 
only is an open question, and it is anyway subject to political choice (for 
instance, it has been recently rejected in Switzerland through a referen-
dum). The second is to include in the board of executives some worker re-
presentatives. Although they cannot obviously decide the majority in the 
board, their presence can help rendering the issue more known and expose 
in this way to all workers and to the public opinion the questions of fairness 
that it implies. 
b) Redistribution measures 
Once all these measures to prevent inequality are taken, even if they ha-
ve been successfully taken, there will always be a residual inequality, 
which might be called physiological, not due to distortions of the market or 
to power relationship, but reflecting different skills, different efforts, diffe-
rent productivity and different responsibilities, according to the value that 
society attributes to all these elements. 
Value judgments are therefore determinant in establishing the accepta-
ble level of inequality. If this residual inequality is considered socially un-
fair it may also call for adjustment through redistribution by taxation and 
transfers, and would add up to the demand for redistribution deriving from 
the existing inequality due to the failure, or the absence, of measures to 
prevent it. It is obvious that the higher the “market” inequality, the stronger 
will be the demand for redistribution. In fact, the empirical evidence shows 
that redistribution measures are generally wider and stronger precisely 
where market inequality is higher. 
A first negative consequence of trying to correct market inequality 
trough subsequent distribution measures is that people who have benefited 
from inequality may have accumulated so much wealth and so much power 
as to be able to buy votes or to adopt other corruption practices to resist 
against such measures being decided or being actually implemented. This 
would drive the political and economic system into a dangerous tunnel of 
inefficiency and decay. This is another reason why measures to prevent the 
rise of excessive disparities in income and wealth in the first place should 
be preferred, and why great care should be given to the choice of appropria-
te redistribution  measures. 
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A second possible negative effect is given by the possible opportunistic 
behavior of economic agents (individuals and firms) relative to both tran-
sfers and in-kind benefits, like, for instance turning to irregular economy to 
avoid paying tax, or diminishing work effort if taxation is too progressive, 
or also behaving strategically or fraudulently in order to get higher tran-
sfers. In addition there is the risk that badly designed transfers may accrue 
to people who are already better off. In all these cases redistribution would 
be lessened and the working of the economy would be badly affected. 
A general question has to be raised as to what is meant by redistribution 
and how it is measured. Generally by redistribution is meant a change in 
the Gini coefficients, and the size of the change (that is the difference be-
tween the “market” Gini coefficient and the “net” Gini coefficient) is taken 
as its measure. Progressive taxation as well as transfers may have similar 
effects in this regard, but it should be noticed that the effect of progressive 
taxation, although it reduces the Gini coefficients does not produce any ac-
tual improvement of the income of the poorer; so, in a sense it is doubtful 
whether a “substantial” (rather than a merely “statistical”) redistributive ef-
fect can be attributed to taxation in itself. Only if taxation is used to finance 
transfers (either monetary or in the kind of welfare services ) to low income 
people it will imply a significant “redistribution”. Otherwise, if used to fi-
nance public expenditure as such, it would be only a fair way of sharing the 
burden of government expenditure; excessive personal disposable incomes 
would in fact be cut, but the low income people would not benefit from it. 
This is, of course, a simple consequence of the fact that the Gini coefficient 
can be reduced of the same amount either by lowering incomes at the top or 
by increasing incomes at the bottom. In statistical terms it is the same, but 
if we have to give to the word “redistribution” its proper meaning, it makes 
a difference. The terms “redistribution” and reduction of the Gini coeffi-
cient cannot be considered, in this respect, as synonymous. It should also 
be noted that the effect of fiscal redistribution in the Oecd countries has not 
been able to offset the increasing trend in inequality, which has been main-
tained also in terms of net income (Caminada, 2012). 
Obviously, different composition of taxation can have different impact 
on inequality in disposable income. The more progressive is taxation, the 
higher will be the gini coefficient reduction: therefore the idea of increasing 
the weight of indirect taxation (which is regressive) relative to direct inco-
me taxation is opposite to the target of decreasing inequality. “In an anal-
ysis of 12 european union economies, the effective indirect tax rate, calcu-
lated as the share of consumption taxes in total household income, is on a-
verage three times higher for the bottom income decile than for the top de-
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cile. While both value added tax  and excise duties are regressive in all e-
conomies, excise taxes are especially regressive, their share in total income 
being four time higher in the bottom income decile than in the top decile” 
(Bastagli, 2012). 
Rising progressivity, fighting tax avoidance, cancelling tax havens are 
all measures that work in favour of diminishing inequality of disposable in-
come. 
Transfers and provision of welfare services play a similar role, but in 
addition, as we said before, they bring actual benefit to low income people.  
As it has been mentioned above, opportunistic behavior of agents and 
bad policy design could result in a negative impact on the effectiveness of 
redistribution but also on the level of activity of the entire economy and on 
the path of growth. 
On the other hand if transfers and in-kind benefits are devoted to im-
prove the access to and the quality of educational services, or to improve 
the access to and the quality of health services, or to cope with the housing 
problems they are beneficial to social cohesion and to growth. Therefore, 
more than a warning relative to the interpretation of these data, these consi-
derations are to be meant as a hint to the great care that has to be paid  
when designing the structure and the intensity of fiscal policy. 
A reinforcement of non income taxation is needed if wealth inequality is 
considered in addition to income inequality. Taxes on wealth are generally 
lower than income taxes, and so are taxes on property and on inheritance, 
and so both gross and net wealth inequality is higher than gross and net in-
come inequality. The disproportion has even increased in times of fiscal 
consolidation (Davies, 2008). 
In fact, the way in which the target of fiscal consolidation is being pur-
sued in most European countries on one side includes the downsizing of 
social and welfare services and on the other side goes together with a  rise 
in taxation (especially of the regressive indirect kind) and a pressure to-
wards lowering wages. A heavier fiscal pressure on low range pensions in 
some countries (particularly in Italy) contributes to growth of inequality. 
On the contrary, according to the above considerations,  the design of 
fiscal and transfer policies capable of  effectively reducing the disparities in 
disposable income and at the same time avoiding a negative impact on eco-
nomic performance should be possible if it were oriented towards the fol-
lowing directions. 
In the first place a switch towards more progressive taxation and less re-
gressive indirect taxes. This would not only ensure a greater impact on e-
qualitarian redistribution, but would also be a stimulus to growth, due to the 
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increase in aggregate demand, given the higher marginal propensity to con-
sume of lower income people relative to higher income. In the second place 
, the basis for the tax revenue should be expanded by means of extension of 
taxation to wealth and property, by means of effectively counteracting tax 
evasion and by means of effectively preventing the use of fiscal havens. 
Again, these measures would reduce disposable income inequality without 
dampening  the growth of the economy. 
As for transfers and welfare services, expenditure on public housing, 
public health services and public education services would be beneficial 
both for reducing inequality and for fostering the growth of the economy. 
In order to avoid these social services and benefits being appropriated 
mainly by the rich, the provision of such services on the basis of means-
tests has been often advocated. The question is still a controversial one, but 
two things should be noticed. First, the effectiveness of this approach requi-
res absolute reliability of the tests; in many countries, and particularly in 
Italy the system would turn towards opposite effects due to the ascertained 
unreliability of the official data about personal incomes. Second, if the tax 
system was really and strongly progressive a redistributive effect would 
come out automatically even with universal access to welfare services be-
cause, at the end, people would pay differently for the same services accor-
ding to their incomes, differently taxed according to their levels. 
It should be added that right in times of crisis, increasing expenditures 
in selected public services would help directly redistribution and growth, 
and through growth of GDP also fiscal consolidation. These sectors are, in 
particular, those most relevant for getting more and better employment: the 
improvement of skills through better education and vocational training and 
the reinforcement of employment services to help the matching between 
demand and supply in the labour market. “The best performers among the 
rich countries in terms of economic, employment, social cohesion and e-
quality outcomes have one thing in common: a large welfare state that does 
several things at the same time, investing in people, stimulating and sup-
porting them to be active, and also adequately protecting them and their 
children when everything else fails.” (Marx and Werbist, 2014). This con-
clusion of an empirical study adds  to theoretical considerations put forward 
in the dispute about supposed detrimental effects of welfare state on eco-
nomic performance (Fadda, 2014). 
As a final conclusion it can be said that although acting to prevent e-
xcessive gross pre tax-transfers income inequality is preferable, also active 
appropriate redistribution fiscal and welfare policies are necessary. Unfor-
tunately, both the crisis and the trend impressed in most countries to fiscal 
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consolidation seems to make it difficult to take measure to prevent inequa-
lity and to redistribute income. But unless this trend is reversed we are 
bound to see in the near future a growth rather then a decline in income and 
wealth inequality. 
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